Macquarie Point Multipurpose Stadium
Public Hearing Technical Note

Technical Note Number	13
Subject	Emergency Management and Safety
Date	9 July 2025

1. Background

1.1 This Technical Note 13 is intended to assist with understanding disaster and emergency procedures including evacuation at the stadium. It responds to the Panel's request for information concerning emergency exit routes and places for safe egress, and how the venue would be managed if a gate, such as the Gate 1 route was unavailable.

1.2 This Technical Note contains:

(a) at sections 2 and 3, additional information on how safety considerations have informed the design of the stadium including the implementation of the *Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds*, developed by the Sports Grounds Safety Authority (commonly referred to as the 'Green Guide') (**the Green Guide**) to provide for safe emergency egress;

(b) at section 4, advice from emergency services consulted in the design process;

(c) at section 5, explanation of the egress drawings provided to the Panel on 1 June 2025 which show that exits that can be activated to support dynamic management of egress in the event of an emergency;

(d) at section 6, explanation of emergency evacuation if one gate is closed;

(e) at section 7, examples of other operational stadia in similar environments; and

(f) at section 8, response to concerns raised by a representor in relation to the safety of the gate 3 entrance.

1.3 The Technical Note does not attach:

(a) the Green Guide because, similar to Australian Standards, the Green Guide is a licensed document and therefore not able to be reproduced. The Green Guide is accessible online;[1] and

(b) the Security Schematic Design Report, High-Level Hostile Vehicle Mitigation Brief and the current Draft Emergency Management Plan prepared for the project, as publication of these documents is considered a potential security risk. However, they can be provided in confidence at the Panel's request.

1.4 The Proponent also makes the following preliminary points:

(a) Discussions with all relevant agencies are likely to concern event management and operations, and also the role of the stadium as a destination in broader City security and resilience planning. It is neither timely, appropriate nor necessary to speculate on the broader role. The Proponent limits this response to questions concerning the area available around the site to support evacuation.

[1] Information on the Green Guide can be found at https://sgsa.org.uk/document/greenguide/

(b) The Proponent notes the application of the Green Guide and attention to it by experienced stadia architects in consultation with Tasmania Police and emergency services.

(c) The Proponent is not able, nor considers it appropriate to spell out the precise measures or outcomes for inter-agency planning, operation and security measures that will necessarily form part of detailed and regular co-operation with State and federal agencies, also noting that the establishment and conduct of this co-operation is a matter for government under direction and necessarily after the ending of the caretaker provisions as a minimum.

(d) The Proponent submits that for the purposes of planning approval there is sufficient information to conclude that the stadium can reasonably be expected to meet the agencies standards and capacity for emergency and evacuation procedures.

2. Green Guide informing design

2.1 Mr Richardson referred to the Green Guide, and in its role in informing stadium design, planning and management regarding safety.

2.2 The Green Guide is an internationally recognised advisory document developed by the Sports Grounds Safety Authority. It is used around the world by agencies, architects and designers as a best practice guide for the development and refurbishment of stadia. It serves as a comprehensive reference for regulation and licensing, as well as the design, planning, safety management, and operation of sports grounds.

2.3 The primary objective of the Green Guide is to aid in determining the safe capacity of sports grounds. It provides a structured framework to evaluate and manage the number of spectators that can be safely accommodated at any given event, including how to calculate the entry, holding, exit and emergency exit capacities.

2.4 It sets out guidelines for the safe movement of people in, out and around stadiums, including:

(a) circulation, including ingress, egress, vertical circulation and concourses;

(b) structures and installations, including barriers and separating elements and spectator accommodation (both seated and standing);

(c) the importance of effective systems including communications and control systems and mechanical and electrical installations; and

(d) other relevant specific items, including relating to fire safety, medical and first aid, and media provision.

2.5 When implementing the Green Guide, the overarching goal is to provide safety at the sports ground during its use for specified activities. This involves considering various contextual factors such as the type, function, and layout of the ground. Additionally, safety assessments must account for the specific nature of each event type, expected spectator numbers, time of day, spectator profiles, their potential interactions, crowd behaviour, and prevailing weather conditions.

2.6 It is important to note that the safe management of stadia involves both design and management of operations. During the operation of the stadium, ground management holds ultimate responsibility for the safety of all individuals within the sports ground. This is a fundamental principle of the Green Guide. Mr Avery of Stadiums Tasmania acknowledged the key role Stadiums Tasmania would have regarding safety as the future owner and operator of the stadium, when he appeared before the Panel on 3 July 2025. This will be secured via permit conditions.

3. Safety-in-Design and emergency management

3.1 Safety-in-Design, or Safe Design, is the practice of proactively identifying risks and hazards during the design process and implementing control measures to eliminate or mitigate these.

3.2 Safe Work Australia produce a *Safe Design of Structures* Code of Practice[2] which has informed design for this project, the code of practice is approved under section 274 of the *Work Health and Safety Act 2012.*[3]

3.3 As part of the Safety-in-Design process for this project, workshops have been held between the proponent, operator and design team including engineers, with the aim of identifying whole of life hazards and risks. A Hazard Analysis and Risk Management Register has been developed and will be maintained throughout the project, from design through to demolition at the end of its lifespan. Mitigations have been, and will continue to be, identified to inform adaptations in the design as documents are prepared for construction. This process reflects the *Safe Work Australia* Code of Practice.

3.4 To inform the design of the project, a Security Schematic Design Report was produced in October 2024 by Intelligent Risks Pty Ltd to provide to inform the security systems and infrastructure design requirements for the stadium. It set out measures that provide an appropriate level of protection for the stadium through all levels of activity – from non-event mode to major sporting or entertainment events. The measures comprise a range of technical and physical measures, intended to develop strength in depth, through the layering of mutually supporting security infrastructure. The report was developed at this early stage to inform the design and guide the further work of the design program.

3.5 A High-Level Hostile Vehicle Mitigation Brief was also prepared by Intelligent Risks Pty Ltd. The brief outlined the core principles of Hostile Vehicle Mitigation to inform the stadium development. It also summarised the options available and options to mitigate potential vulnerabilities. The brief has informed the design of the stadium, including landscaping plans.

3.6 A Draft Emergency Management Plan has been produced by Intelligent Risks which covers both event and non-event mode activities. The objective of the Plan is to provide the framework and procedures for the response to an emergency or crisis incident that might prejudice public safety or security or severely disrupt operations. The Plan details the actions and responsibilities of stadium management and staff in the event of an emergency or major incident. The proposed permit conditions will require the continued refinement of emergency management planning, including requiring a Flood and Emergency Evacuation Management Plan and an Event Management Plan which, amongst other things, will address emergency responder access and coordination.

3.7 The stadium design and construction is required to comply with the *Building Code of Australia 2022*. In addition to the building code, performance-based solutions leveraging the Green Guide and other relevant guidelines, standards and industry benchmarks, are utilised to ensure the stadium is designed to be fit for the intended purpose and safe for operators, maintainers, users and patrons. In the context of emergency management and egress the stadium design process includes engagement with:

(a) the relevant building surveyor;

(b) a specialist fire engineering team;

(c) a specialist pedestrian movement modelling team;

(d) a dedicated peer review team; and

(e) a specialist risk consultant.

[2] https://www.safeworkaustralia.gov.au/doc/model-code-practice-safe-design-structures.
[3] https://www.safeworkaustralia.gov.au/doc/model-work-health-and-safety-act.

4. Engagement with emergency services

4.1 User engagement and input has been key to informing the design of the stadium, this includes with Emergency Services. User groups have been presented the design as it develops and been asked to provide feedback and advice. This input has informed design updates during the process.

4.2 As part of this process, the Corporation has held workshops and meetings with the emergency services. This has included meeting with Ambulance Tasmania, Tasmania Police and Tasmania Fire Services, and included working through an overview of the building including the:

(a) control room which includes workstations for 8-12 staff, CCTV and two adjoining rooms for forward control that include 10 desks (6 desks for staff and 4 police desks). A simulated view from the control room to the field of play has also been shared;

(b) first aid areas including three first aid rooms each with at least one treatment bed, work counter with sink and accessible toilet;

(c) dedicated police facilities – this includes a reception/waiting area, police office including 6 desks, a breakout area, interview room and amenities;

(d) security offices including a main security office with 6 desks and amenities adjacent to the police facilities;

(e) vehicle access including the ambulance route and ambulance parking bay; and

(f) egress routes including for an emergency.

4.3 Emergency services have confirmed they are comfortable with the stadium design direction and approach to safety. This engagement will continue, including to support the development of detailed plans and simulations. It is normal for operational safety and emergency management plans to be developed alongside stadium design and finalised prior to stadium operation. This intent is reflected in the proposed permit conditions.

4.4 The user engagement will continue throughout detailed design and the construction phase with the next steps being:

(a) review of the Hostile Vehicle Mitigation Strategy incorporation into the landscape design; and

(b) emergency scenario modelling with emergency services.

4.5 Correspondence from Emergency Services is provided at **Attachment 1**.

5. Emergency egress movements

5.1 The egress drawings that have been provided to the Panel[4] reflect static modelling. They reflect one way that those inside of the building could exit. Dynamic modelling continues through the process and is continuing in parallel with this process for various types of events and capacities (including concert mode), in normal and emergency egress scenarios. The scenarios inform operational mitigation strategies in concert mode and sport mode.

5.2 Consultation with emergency services confirms that police and ambulance will be on site for sport and concert events. Where appropriate fire services may also be in attendance. For example, the fire service may attend a major concert event, subject to assessment of stage flammability. For a typical event, event incident control in conjunction with the Tasmania Police will be the first responders noting that there is provision for emergency services vehicles to be located on site under the stadium.

[4] https://www.planning.tas.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/808835/474-Aaron-Wood-doc-2-Submitted-08-May-2025.pdf.

5.3 The Green Guide provides stadia are designed to ensure people can reach a 'Place of Reasonable Safety' and then eventually a 'Place of Safety'. As defined in the Green Guide, a 'Place of Reasonable Safety' is a place where persons are safe for a limited amount of time. For the stadium, Places of Reasonable Safety are protected stairwells or the concourse. As defined in the Green Guide, a Place of Safety is an area where a person is no longer in danger from the effects of fire or other threat. Such places, which are defined as 'Zone 5' in the Green Guide, may be a road, walkway or open space adjacent to the sports ground. For the stadium, the Place of Safety is outside of the façade line of the building. This includes Evans Street, Hunter Street, and Cenotaph.

5.4 Each emergency will be different and will therefore require a different response. The stadium design has been informed by the need to be adaptable to different responses. People typically choose to leave from their nearest exit. The design considers opportunities to move people in different ways subject to the incident. The external concourse provides a complete step-free circulation route allowing staff to redirect patrons depending on the emergency context.

5.5 The baseline emergency egress strategy aims to reflect as much as possible the normal egress movement. The normal egress strategy aims to restrict volumes of people to the Tasman Highway and Brooker Avenue intersection by providing a more intuitive route back to the City and Salamanca. The movement utilises Davey Street/Evans Street as well as Evans Street/Hunter Street as the two primary routes back to the CBD. The restrictions on vehicles along Evans Street and Hunter Street provide the dispersal opportunity away from the stadium.

5.6 This movement strategy has been facilitated by including in the design, the option for management to have flexible use of Gate 3 egress routes, depending on the situation and size of the event. In the even to of an emergency, patrons from Gate 3 can be directed south by using Gate 3 (between the Goods Shed and practice wickets) as ingress and Gate 3b (to the south of the practice wickets) as egress[5]. Management would also have the ability to use a combination of these.

5.7 There is also capacity for patrons from Gate 4 to be directed south to the large Gate 1 exit and plaza. This would see a proportion of people from Gate 4 directed to the bus zone, but facilitated away from the path of any emergency vehicles. This allows emergency vehicles to access the site from either the Tasman Highway/Brooker Avenue intersection or via the Northern Access Road. These modelled pathways are shown in **Attachment 2**.

5.8 In the event of an emergency that requires an additional space around the stadium to be secured, it is envisaged that police will take control of a portion of Davey Street south of the Royal Engineers Building. As noted above, police will already be on site for a major event when there are large numbers of people needing to exit the stadium area which will aid the speed of their response. If required, Police could direct southbound vehicles via Liverpool Street.

5.9 A scenario that requires an emergency services vehicle to come from the south can either be facilitated via Evans Street (restricted for a major event) or via the internal stadium road from the north, subject to the emergency and risk profile.

5.10 The design provides for a variety of responses to enable the stadium management and emergency services to both plan for a range of options and to adapt as circumstances may require. Management responsibilities will be set out in a Flood and Emergency Evacuation Management Plan as required in the proposed permit conditions. This will be developed working with emergency services.

[5] Note Gate 3b has been designed as egress only for use by management as required. It is not proposed as an ingress gate. Gate 3 (between the Goods Shed and practice wickets) remains the main plaza and entry point in the north-west.

6. Emergency egress movements if a gate is unusable

6.1 The Panel enquired as to what would happen if one of the stadium gates could not be used during an emergency. An emergency that assumes a localised gate closure is likely to be that of a localised incident such as a localised fire.

6.2 The internal concourse extends 360 degrees around the building, and therefore in the event a gate is closed, affected spectators would be redirected to egress via an alternate gate. If an exit is removed and a full stadium exit is required, then the immediate affected spectator volumes will need to be assigned to the nearest exit and then subsequent patrons shifted to different exits to reduce the localised threat. This would be a contingency planning response. The Green Guide does not provide guidance on designing additional width to accommodate for such an incident, but instead recommends coordination between relevant bodies to assess and plan for different scenarios.

6.3 In certain circumstances, the usage of the field of play and Pitch Access Vomitories (access ways designed for vehicle, maintenance and secure people movements) may be utilised. However, this would be subject to the specific localised risk and response. The stadium design allows for such access if this is deemed the appropriate response.

6.4 In the case of a concert mode, a Pitch Access Vomitory is removed from egress calculations to understand the volume of patrons that can safely be accommodated on the pitch, recognising all other exit routes. This is in coordination and part of the Fire Engineering Brief which will be developed at the appropriate stage of the project.

6.5 In the example proposed, of Gate 1 being unavailable, the design provides for multiple options for ingress and egress which management will be able to coordinate with emergency services depending on the type of emergency. As shown in the attached egress images, one option would be to use the egress only gate at Gate 3 (3b to the south of the cricket practice wickets) which supports patrons exiting to the south (as shown in Attachment 2). As shown in previous egress drawings, Gate 3 (the ingress entry between the Goods Shed and practice wickets) could also be used in parallel to assemble and move patrons to the north towards the Cenotaph and away from Gate 1. This flexibility in the design will enable management and emergency services to adjust to emergencies if and how they unfold.

7. Stadia comparisons

7.1 Mr Richardson was asked if he was aware whether this site was more constrained than other sites on which stadiums have been developed. In addition to the examples Mr Richardson referred to that operate as part of built environments, including Marvel Stadium in Melbourne and Alliance Stadium in Sydney, examples of operational stadia of comparative size and locations are provided at **Attachment 3**.

8. Gate 3 entrance

8.1 Mr de Gryse in his submission and through questions he put to Mr Richardson, raised a concern regarding the actual and perceived safety of the Gate 3 entrance when the doors to the stadium are closed.

8.2 The Gate 3 entry between the practice wickets and Goods Shed is not a small or narrow space. The distance between the practice wickets and Goods Shed is approximately 22m. This is a generous space that benefits from activity and passive surveillance from the stadium, Goods Shed and practice wickets. Furthermore, as shown on the plans, this area will be well lit, monitored by CCTV and have onsite security 24-hours a day.

Attachment 1

Correspondence from emergency services

From: Webster, Dale E [redacted]
Sent: Monday, 7 July 2025 11:00 AM
To: Healey, Mathew [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: RE: Clarification for the Tasmanian Planning Commission (TPC) on 3 key areas - DPFEM

- The provision of access for Ambulance Tasmania vehicles is essential to the design process, and similar to that of TFS who have advised that it is a requirement of the building regulations that their access is considered. AT are a stakeholder in the design process and has provided comments to the design team for consideration.
- Department of Health and AT have actively participated as a stakeholder in the Macquarie Point Stadium (MPS) discussions.
- Department of Health and AT have been given opportunities to provide feedback to the MPS design team regarding emergency service-specific spaces within the stadium. This includes vehicle staging areas and the emergency operations centre.
- AT has been provided the opportunity to provide feedback on the proposed Emergency Management Plan.
- AT highlights the importance of exercising emergency management plans prior to completion of construction and prior to occupancy being granted at completion of construction.

Regards

Tasmanian Government

Dale WEBSTER PSM
Secretary
(he/him/his)
Department of Health
[redacted]
[redacted] | www.health.tas.gov.au



THE NEXT GENERA
STRENGTH, VISIO

6-13 JULY 2025

'I acknowledge Aboriginal people as the traditional owners of this Land and respect their culture and identity which has been bound up with the Land, Sea, Waterways and Sky for generations.'

From: Healey, Mathew [redacted]
Sent: Sunday, 6 July 2025 5:05 PM
To: Webster, Dale E [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Subject: FW: Clarification for the Tasmanian Planning Commission (TPC) on 3 key areas - DPFEM

Hi Dale

As discussed, we are pulling together a Technical Note for the TPC panel on emergency management and would like some words from emergency services as an attachment. It would be great to get some brief remarks from Ambulance's perspective that we can add to Police and Fire's points below.

Ideally, we would like to file the note sometime tomorrow if possible.

Cheers

Mat

Mathew Healey | Deputy Secretary
Strategy and Delivery

Department of Premier and Cabinet
[redacted]
[redacted] | www.dpac.tas.gov.au



From: Toohey, John [redacted]
Sent: Friday, 4 July 2025 2:37 PM
To: Healey, Mathew [redacted]
Subject: Clarification for the Tasmanian Planning Commission (TPC) on 3 key areas - DPFEM

[redacted]

OFFICIAL

Dear Mat,

Regarding clarification for the Tasmanian Planning Commission (TPC) on 3 key areas:

1. **Evacuation Capacity**: Whether DPFEM is satisfied with the stadium's capacity to evacuate patrons in a timely and effective manner.
2. **Emergency Services Access:** Whether emergency services are confident in the operational response to an emergency, particularly regarding any potential conflict between patron evacuation and emergency services accessing the site. Is this considered an unreasonable risk?
3. **Crowd Safety During Evacuation:** Whether emergency services (DPFEM) are generally comfortable with the risks associated with crowd movement during an emergency, and whether appropriate plans are in place to manage an evacuation.

I can advise that, Inspector Luke Walker met with Andrew McGuinness (TFS) and I to ensure a collaborative approach. Unfortunately, Ambulance Tasmania (AT) was unable to attend.

Below is a summary of our comments addressing the Board's queries:

Tasmania Police:

- Under the provisions of the Planning Permit and Enabling Legislation Report, the Commissioner of Police will endorse the Flood and Emergency Evacuation Management Plan as the relevant Regulator 12 months prior to the commenced use of the multipurpose stadium.

- As the process continues, Tasmania Police will undertake testing and exercising of the Plan for the operation of the stadium, ensuring compliance with minimum standards or requirements set out in national and international guidance documents.
- Tasmania Police recommends specific engagement continues with TFS, SES and AT as emergency responders, in addition to local police who will be responsible for effecting any evacuation or emergency response.
- Tasmania Police highlight the importance of exercising emergency management plans prior to construction.
- Tasmania Police has actively participated as a stakeholder in the Macquarie Point Stadium (MPS) discussions.
- Tasmania Police has been given opportunities to provide feedback to the MPS design team regarding emergency service-specific spaces within the stadium. This includes vehicle staging areas and the emergency operations centre.
- Tasmania Police has been provided the opportunity to provide feedback on the proposed Emergency Management Plan.

Tasmania Fire Service (provided by Andrew):

- Building Regulations/Building Approval – Fire Evacuation/Occupant Safety – The building regulations have provisions designed to maximise the safety of occupants. These provisions are designed to allow occupants time to evacuate safely without being overcome by the effects of an emergency. The design team have engaged a fire safety engineering team who will evaluate the fire safety of the building through computer modelling and other engineer factors. The design team have not completed the fire engineering modelling evaluation yet, but the Tasmania Fire Service are a stakeholder in the fire engineering design process. The Tasmania Fire Service will review and provide comments on the fire engineering evaluation once completed. This process is completed before building approval is issued.
- Emergency Vehicle Access - The provision of access for the Tasmania Fire Service vehicles is regulated by the building regulations. The Tasmania Fire Service are a stakeholder in the design process and has provided comments to the design team for consideration. The design process and building approval have not been finalised, and the Tasmania Fire Service expect to be consulted as the design progresses. The Tasmania Fire Service have provided comments to the design team stating that the discharge of occupants from the building during an evacuation does not obstruct the emergency vehicle paths to the building and fire services infrastructure. The design of the emergency vehicle access (TFS Appliances and subsequently other emergency vehicles) is completed before building approval is issued.
- Evacuation procedures – The Fire Service Act 1979 and General Fire Regulations 2021 regulate the design of fire evacuation procedures. The evacuation procedures detail how the evacuation will be managed and include designated assembly areas. Typically, the design of the evacuation procedures is not completed until the design of the building has been finalised. Tasmania Fire Service have recommended that the design team engage an evacuation procedure and planning consultant to start preparing the evacuation procedure and plan in consultation with the Tasmania Fire Service. An evacuation procedure has not been submitted to Tasmania Fire Service for review at this stage and that is normal in these circumstances.

I am informed that it may be of value having a representative attend and provide advice directly to the Tasmania Planning Commission (TPC) next week from emergency services. It is the preference of DPFEM that this written submission be considered without the need for verbal

evidence. If the TPC elects for verbal evidence, myself (TasPol) and/ or Andrew McGuinness (TFS) are nominated as those members.

Take care

John Toohey
A/Commander | 2996
Southern District
[redacted]
GPO Box 308 Hobart TAS 7000
Department of Police, Fire and Emergency Management
Accountability | Integrity | Respect | Support

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Attachment 2

Egress routes including Gate 3b

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Rev	Description	By	Date
P1	ISSUED FOR PROJECT OF STATE SIGNIFICANCE		04.07.2025


AFL MODE

TOTAL EGRESS COUNT:
23,000 SEATS
+ 1,500 STANDING
+ 120 AFL MEDIA
+ 1,500 STAFF

INSIDE BUILDING ENVELOPE
STEPPED WIDTH = CAPACITY/66/6min
ONE LEVEL EXIT WIDTH = CAPACITY/82/6min

OUTSIDE BUILDING ENVELOPE
STEPPED WIDTH = CAPACITY/66/8min
ONE LEVEL EXIT WIDTH = CAPACITY/82/8min

FLOW RATE	TRAVEL TIME
On a stepped surface 66 persons per metre per minute	**Low fire risk** 8 minutes
On one level surface 82 persons per metre per minute	**Medium fire risk** 6 minutes



Scale 1:500

0 5m 10m 25m 50m

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Scale

Zone

Client
Macquarie Point Development Corporation

Project No.
322070.00

Project
MACQUARIE POINT MULTIPURPOSE STADIUM
41 Evans St, Hobart TAS 7000

Acknowledgement
The Stadium Team acknowledge the traditional owners of this land, the Muwinina people, and pay respect to those that have passed before us. We acknowledge today's Tasmanian Aboriginal people, the Palawa, their Elders, and their enduring custodianship of Lutruwita/Tasmania.

Drawing Title
GROUND PLANE - EXTERNAL CONCOURSE PLAN MODAL SPLIT AFL

Document Control Status:
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Project Director: AR/SH	Revision Date: 04.07.2025
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
Rev	Description	By	Date
P1	ISSUED FOR PROJECT OF STATE SIGNIFICANCE		04.07.2025

CONCERT MODE
TOTAL EGRESS COUNT:
16,400 BOWL PAX
+ 15,100 PITCH STANDING
+ 1,500 STAFF

INSIDE BUILDING ENVELOPE
STEPPED WIDTH = CAPACITY/66/6min
ONE LEVEL EXIT WIDTH = CAPACITY/82/6min

OUTSIDE BUILDING ENVELOPE
STEPPED WIDTH = CAPACITY/66/8min
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Scale 1:500

0 5m 10m 25m 50m

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Project
MACQUARIE POINT MULTIPURPOSE STADIUM
41 Evans St, Hobart TAS 7000

Acknowledgement
The Stadium Team acknowledge the traditional owners of this land, the Muwinina people, and pay respect to those that have passed before us. We acknowledge today's Tasmanian Aboriginal people, the Palawa, their Elders, and their enduring custodianship of Lutruwita/Tasmania.

Drawing Title
GROUND PLANE - EXTERNAL
CONCOURSE PLAN MODAL SPLIT
CONCERT

Document Control Status:
ISSUED FOR PROJECT OF STATE SIGNIFICANCE







Co-ordinated: MM	Drawn: AC
Project Designer: AR/SH	Scale: 1 : 500 @ A0
Project Director: AR/SH	Revision Date: 04.07.2025
Drawing Number: MPMS-CXC-DR-01-A18-0001	Revision: P1

PLOT STAMP DATE: 4/07/2025 9:14:28 PM

Attachment 3

Examples of operational stadia of comparative size and locations

STADIA COMPARISON


OVAL	NINJA STADIUM (HOBART)	GMHBA STADIUM (GEELONG)	MANUKA OVAL (CANBERRA)	PEOPLE FIRST STADIUM (GOLD COAST)	AAMI PARK (MELBOURNE)	MACPOINT STADIUM (HOBART)
GROUND DIMENSIONS (BOUNDARY TO BOUNDARY)*	135 m x 173 m	126 m x 183 m	149 m x 175 m	145 m x 174 m	82 m x 136 m	139.5 m x 172.5 m
GROUND DIMENSIONS (FIELD)*	124 m x 160 m	115 m x 170 m	138 m x 162 m	134 m x 161 m	RECTANGULAR FIELD	128.5 m x 159.5 m
SITE AREA (M²)*	64,000	70,000	61,500	85,000	55,480	101,500
STADIUM FOOTPRINT (M²) (INCL. FIELD)*	31,000	45,600	34,500	42,700	35,000	44,000
CAPACITY	19,500	40,000	15,000	27,500	30,050	24,500
* Measurements from aerial photography are indicative and approximate.						


AAMI PARK (MELBOURNE)

INFORMATION	AAMI PARK (MELBOURNE)
GROUND DIMENSIONS (BOUNDARY TO BOUNDARY)*	82 m x 136 m
GROUND DIMENSIONS (FIELD)*	RECTANGULAR FIELD
SITE AREA (M²)*	55,480
STADIUM FOOTPRINT (M²) (INCL. FIELD)*	35,000
CAPACITY	30,050
* Measurements from aerial photography are nominal.	










GMHBA STADIUM (GEELONG)


INFORMATION	GMHBA STADIUM (GEELONG)
GROUND DIMENSIONS (BOUNDARY TO BOUNDARY)*	126 m x 183 m
GROUND DIMENSIONS (FIELD)*	115 m x 170 m
SITE AREA (M²)*	70,000
STADIUM FOOTPRINT (M²) (INCL. FIELD)*	45,600
CAPACITY	40,000
* Measurements from aerial photography are nominal.	





NINJA STADIUM (HOBART)


INFORMATION	NINJA STADIUM (HOBART)
GROUND DIMENSIONS (BOUNDARY TO BOUNDARY)*	135 m x 173 m
GROUND DIMENSIONS (FIELD)*	124 m x 160 m
SITE AREA (M²)*	64,000
STADIUM FOOTPRINT (M²) (INCL. FIELD)*	31,000
CAPACITY	19,500
* Measurements from aerial photography are nominal.	





MANUKA OVAL (CANBERRA)


INFORMATION	MANUKA OVAL (CANBERRA)
GROUND DIMENSIONS (BOUNDARY TO BOUNDARY)*	149 m x 175 m
GROUND DIMENSIONS (FIELD)*	138 m x 162 m
SITE AREA (M²)*	61,500
STADIUM FOOTPRINT (M²) (INCL. FIELD)*	34,500
CAPACITY	15,000
* Measurements from aerial photography are nominal.	





PEOPLE FIRST STADIUM
(GOLD COAST)

INFORMATION	PEOPLE FIRST STADIUM (GOLD COAST)
GROUND DIMENSIONS (BOUNDARY TO BOUNDARY)*	145 m x 174 m
GROUND DIMENSIONS (FIELD)*	134 m x 161 m
SITE AREA (M²)*	85,000
STADIUM FOOTPRINT (M²) (INCL. FIELD)*	42,700
CAPACITY	27,500
* Measurements from aerial photography are nominal.	





MACPOINT STADIUM
(HOBART)

INFORMATION	MACPOINT STADIUM (HOBART)
GROUND DIMENSIONS (BOUNDARY TO BOUNDARY)	139.5 m x 172.5 m
GROUND DIMENSIONS (FIELD)	128.5 m x 159.5 m
SITE AREA (M²)	101,500
STADIUM FOOTPRINT (M²) (INCL. FIELD)	44,000
CAPACITY	24,500

